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Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation$
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Jeffrey W. Knopf

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780804778275

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: June 2013

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804778275.001.0001

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Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses

Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses

Chapter:
(p.13) 2 Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses
Source:
Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation
Author(s):

Jeffrey W. Knopf

Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:10.11126/stanford/9780804778275.003.0002

This chapter describes research on the causes of proliferation and analyzes security assurances. It also summarizes the different terminology used in relation to assurance in an effort to clarify definitions and evaluates how different concepts of assurance relate to one another. In particular, the research on deterrence and reassurance, and the research on the causes of nuclear proliferation are assessed. It uses the term “Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)-related assurances” when it discusses assurances linked with the global regime, whereas “nonproliferation-related assurances” is employed as the more inclusive term that includes bilateral security guarantees. Resolve is often seen as the key among the factors that lead to the credibility of deterrence. Some of the hypotheses presented indicated that in some situations negative assurances may prove to be the more valuable nonproliferation tool.

Keywords:   security assurances, nuclear proliferation, deterrence, reassurance, nonproliferation

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