Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Breakdown in PakistanHow Aid Is Eroding Institutions for Collective Action$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Masooda Bano

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780804781329

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: June 2013

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804781329.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM STANFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.stanford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Stanford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in SSO for personal use (for details see http://www.stanford.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 July 2018

Why Cooperate?

Why Cooperate?

Motives and Decisions of Initiators and Joiners in Self-Regarding Groups

Chapter:
(p.95) 4 Why Cooperate?
Source:
Breakdown in Pakistan
Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:10.11126/stanford/9780804781329.003.0004

This chapter complements the previous one through a detailed analysis of the decision-making processes and motives of initiators and joiners. This time, these concepts are studied within the context of a land rights movement that was led by a low-income tenant Pakistani farmer community. It applies most of the eight principles that Ostrom identified as relevant to beating the free-rider problem. It discusses the argument that the list of crucial variables that Ostrom prepared must include the leaders' material sacrifice. The final section of the chapter forwards the hypothesis that the main reason why aid breaks the cooperation in civil society groups is because aid transforms incentives, which directly changes the group leaders' behavior.

Keywords:   motives, land rights movement, decision-making processes, free-rider problem, material sacrifice, aid, cooperation, incentives

Stanford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.