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Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race$
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Alexander Kelle, Kathryn Nixdorff, and Malcolm Dando

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780804782753

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: June 2013

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804782753.001.0001

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Evolution of the BW Prohibition Regime

Evolution of the BW Prohibition Regime

Assessing Achievements and Weaknesses

Chapter:
(p.137) 7 Evolution of the BW Prohibition Regime
Source:
Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race
Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:10.11126/stanford/9780804782753.003.0007

This chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibition regime. The problem with the BWC does not lie in its intended scope but in its ineffective implementation. The BWC needed to be strengthened, particularly in the areas of verification, implementation, and an established treaty organization to aid in implementation. The confidence-building measures, the protocol negotiations, the first intersessional process, the Sixth Review Conference, the second intersessional process, and science and technology developments will be able to help against the deficiencies of the BWC. The chapter looks at the evaluation of bioterrorism as the primary bioweapons threat. Looking at the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) shows that an incriminating case against a biological weapons proliferator will be made over time by diligently assembling pieces of evidence.

Keywords:   Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, prohibition regime, treaty organization, protocol negotiations, Sixth Review Conference, science and technology, bioterrorism, bioweapons

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