This book presents a theoretical and empirical effort to bring external interveners back into the study of armed conflict. It builds a coherent research program of intervention based on the economic liberalism variant of the liberal paradigm. It argues that intervener states' security considerations and economic interests in the belligerents drive their decisions. External stimuli are viewed as agents of intervention that downplays state preferences and domestic imperatives in decision making. Moreover, the book develops a causal framework that explicitly considers the domestic dimension of economic interests and the institutional environment in which privately organized groups, individuals, and firms that carry out trade interact with their government. Finally, an overview of the chapters included in this book is given.
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