Contents
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Introduction Introduction
-
Proposals for Material Incentives to Donating Organs Proposals for Material Incentives to Donating Organs
-
Conceptual Problems with a “Market for Organs” Conceptual Problems with a “Market for Organs”
-
The Becker and Elias Model The Becker and Elias Model
-
Spot versus Future Markets Spot versus Future Markets
-
Postmortem versus Living-Donor Organs Postmortem versus Living-Donor Organs
-
-
Donor Reaction to Compensation Donor Reaction to Compensation
-
The Issue of Strictly Altruistic Donors The Issue of Strictly Altruistic Donors
-
Existing Disincentives to Donors Existing Disincentives to Donors
-
The “Taint” of Compensation The “Taint” of Compensation
-
Lessons from Markets for Other Body Parts Lessons from Markets for Other Body Parts
-
The Issue of Organ Quality The Issue of Organ Quality
-
Will Supply Drive Demand? Will Supply Drive Demand?
-
-
Prices of Organs Prices of Organs
-
Hypothetical Market Prices Hypothetical Market Prices
-
Survey Evidence Survey Evidence
-
Price Observations from Illegal Markets for Body Parts Price Observations from Illegal Markets for Body Parts
-
Price Evidence from Legal Markets for Body Parts Price Evidence from Legal Markets for Body Parts
-
In-Kind Compensation In-Kind Compensation
-
Importance of Deceased Donor Organs Importance of Deceased Donor Organs
-
-
A Model for Donor Compensation Using a Public Monopsony A Model for Donor Compensation Using a Public Monopsony
-
Outline of the Model Outline of the Model
-
Questions of Institutional Design Questions of Institutional Design
-
The Allocation of Organs The Allocation of Organs
-
Concerns of Political Acceptability and Fairness Concerns of Political Acceptability and Fairness
-
-
Conclusion Conclusion
-
-
-
-
8 Compensation for Organ Donation and a Proposal for a Public Monopsony for Organ Acquisition
Get access-
Published:January 2013
Cite
Abstract
This chapter describes institutional arrangements for the introduction of compensation. It provides a simple mathematical analysis of the likely appearance of a socially directed monopsony procurement organization and establishes several propositions regarding the forms compensation might take. It suggests that both living and deceased-donor kidneys would be rewarded by such an entity, and at differing levels, at least in the early stages and in countries with severe shortages. The chapter reviews the limited empirical evidence relevant to the question of organ compensation rates, and argues that payments are likely to be well below those levels at which cost savings are consumed in acquisition expenses. On the contrary, it is quite likely that organ acquisition will be cheaper under a compensation program. The issue of the effect of offering compensation on altruistic donation levels is also addressed, along with criteria for organ recipients, as well as donor evaluation and enrollment. It is argued that the introduction of compensation for organ donation, for both deceased donors (all organs) and living donors (kidneys), could be implemented quickly in many countries.
Sign in
Get help with accessPersonal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
Institutional access
- Sign in through your institution
- Sign in with a library card Sign in with username/password Recommend to your librarian
Institutional account management
Sign in as administratorPurchase
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Purchasing informationMonth: | Total Views: |
---|---|
March 2024 | 3 |
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.