Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Supply Side of SecurityA Market Theory of Military Alliances$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Tongfi Kim

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780804796965

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804796965.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM STANFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.stanford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Stanford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in SSO for personal use (for details see http://www.stanford.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 15 December 2017

A Domestic Theory of Intra-Alliance Bargaining

A Domestic Theory of Intra-Alliance Bargaining

Chapter:
(p.112) 5 A Domestic Theory of Intra-Alliance Bargaining
Source:
The Supply Side of Security
Author(s):

Tongfi Kim

Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:10.11126/stanford/9780804796965.003.0005

This chapter explains the effects of three domestic variables on a state’s intra-alliance bargaining power. As the existing theories of international relations argue, the presence of effective domestic opposition to cooperation increases a state’s bargaining power in an alliance. The chapter advances our understanding of the domestic sources of bargaining power by further explaining disordinal interaction effects of a leader’s attitude toward an alliance and his or her vulnerability. The effects of a leader’s attitude and vulnerability vary, depending on the value of each variable; vulnerable pro-cooperation leaders and non-vulnerable anti-cooperation leaders have bargaining advantages in intra-alliance bargaining.

Keywords:   domestic politics, two-level game, domestic opposition, leaders’ attitude, leaders’ vulnerability, bargaining power

Stanford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.