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What is the state? How is it implicated in the reproduction of relations of domination? Theorists from Marx to Weber, from Durkheim to Gramsci, from Abrams to Foucault have pondered these questions. In The Encrypted State, anthropologist David Nugent sheds new light on these questions by focusing on disorder and delusion, rather than order and rationality. Nugent analyzes mid-century Peru, where the government experienced a crisis of rule. Officials believed that their efforts to govern were being systematically thwarted by an underground political party called APRA that remained largely invisible to the naked eye. APRA’s ability to disrupt official processes of rule produced deep paranoia among officials. They concluded that the party had established a vast subterranean polity of remarkable power and potency, to which virtually everyone secretly belonged. This episode of paranoia and delusion is especially puzzling because immediately prior everyday administration had been entirely normal and routine. In seeking to understand how irrationality and disorder could emerge out of rationality and order, Nugent finds that government projects had always been delusional. During periods of apparent order and rationality, however, officials had disguised their delusion—from themselves and others—by employing a series of bureaucratic and documentary mechanisms. The Encrypted State identifies these mechanisms and shows how they operated. The book also explores when these mechanisms succeeded in creating a facade of order and rationality and when they failed. In the process, the volume advances a radically new way of thinking about the state.

Phonopoetics tells the neglected story of early “talking records” and their significance for literature from the 1877 invention of the phonograph to some of the first recorded performances of modernist works. The book challenges assumptions of much contemporary criticism by taking the recorded, oral performance as its primary object of analysis and by exploring the historically specific convergences between audio recording technologies, media formats, generic forms, and the institutions and practices surrounding the literary. Opening with an argument that the earliest spoken recordings were a mediated extension of Victorian reading and elocutionary culture, Jason Camlot explains the literary significance of these pre-tape era voice artifacts by analyzing early promotional fantasies about the phonograph as a new kind of speaker, and detailing initiatives to deploy it as a pedagogical tool to heighten literary experience. Through historically-grounded interpretations of Dickens impersonators to recitations of Tennyson to T.S. Eliot’s experimental readings of “The Wasteland” and of a great variety of voices and media in between, this first critical history of the earliest literary sound recordings offers an unusual perspective on the transition from the Victorian to Modern periods and sheds new light on our own digitally mediated relationship to the past.

From the Grounds Up is a study of how peripheral places grappled with globalization at the end of the nineteenth century. Through extensive use of local archives in the Soconusco district of Chiapas, Mexico, the book redefines the body of actors who integrated Latin America’s countryside into international markets for agricultural goods. Alongside plantation owners and foreign investors, a dense but little explored web of indigenous and mestizo villagers, migrant workers, and local politicians quickly adopted and adapted to the production of coffee for export. Following their efforts to overcome violence, isolation, and the absence of reliable institutions, the book illustrates the reshaping of rural economic and political life in the context of integrating global markets. By taking up new export crops like coffee and making use of liberal reforms around private property and contract law, smallholders and laborers defended their interests and secured spaces for their own ongoing participation in rural production. Vast swaths of Latin America’s population were sending the fruits of their labor abroad by the turn of the century. Only by taking into account all those who produced for market can we understand rural Latin America’s transformation in this era.

The inviolability of diplomatic personnel and premises is a cornerstone of interstate relations and international law. As epitomized by the murder of US Ambassador Christopher Stevens in Benghazi, host countries are not always willing or capable to protect foreign diplomats and missions, which have become increasingly vulnerable to terrorism and other forms of political violence. Consequently, states with a large diplomatic presence have complemented host countries protection with a host of additional measures ranging from relocating embassies to fortified suburban locations to the deployment of military, police, and private security guards. By increasing the separateness of foreign envoys from local societies and informing local societies’ perceptions of the sending states, however, diplomatic security policies may not simply protect diplomats, but also reshape the institution and practice of diplomacy. In spite of its theoretical and policy relevance, diplomatic security has received very sporadic scholarly attention. This volume fills this gap by providing a comparative analysis of diplomatic protective policies enacted by the US, China, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Israel and Turkey. Moreover, the book investigates the reasons underlying the evolution of diplomatic security policies over time and their variations across countries, examining the factors underlying the choosing of protective actors and arrangements. It then examines the effectiveness of these arrangements analyzing how diplomatic security policies have been reformed in response to major incidents and the extent to which they can secure diplomats without hindering their ability to interact with local society and tarnishing the image of the sending state.

This book begins with the observation that, during the English Reformation, holy things taken from churches and monasteries were on occasion not smashed or burned but instead given to children as toys. Iconoclasm has tended to feature prominently in narratives of modernity as a process of disenchantment, sometimes understood as the cultural diminution of playfulness: this book asks how these narratives might have to change once we recognize that iconoclasm and child’s play were periodically one and the same. Each chapter begins with an example of iconoclastic child’s play in practice--from locations in England, Germany, and East Asia, involving objects from broken crucifixes to wooden sculptures. The chapters then move outward from these starting points to ask what iconoclasm as child’s play can tell us about the ways in which children, their play, and objects more broadly are made to assume meanings. In pursuing these questions the book draws consistently on major and minor sixteenth-century figures--Erasmus, Bruegel, Spenser--but also ranges backward and forward to consider biblical, classical, and patristic understandings of play, as well as more recent thinkers including Walter Benjamin, D. W. Winnicott, T. W. Adorno, Alfred Gell, Ian Hacking, and Michael Taussig. These figures are used not so much to theorize iconoclasm as child’s play as to consider how this phenomenon might inflect the ways in which we seek to interpret and to organize children, play, and the past.

What explains the rapid and sustained economic rise of Asian countries in high-technology industries, including biomedicals? The biomedical industry, comprised mainly of biopharmaceuticals and medical devices, is among the fastest growing globally and has been an economic-development target of national governments around the world. The book presents a conceptual framework to assess national government management of innovation and entrepreneurship in the fast-growing biomedical industry in Asia, which at current growth rates is on track to become the center of the world economy. Four Asian countries—China, India, Japan, and Singapore—are compared in terms of innovation capacities, government policy, and firm-level strategies underlying competitive advantages in high technology. The book argues that countries that pursue networked technonationalism have been effective in upgrading innovation capacity and also encouraging entrepreneurial activity in targeted industries. The study begins with a global-level analysis of biomedical innovation and entrepreneurship, identifying emerging concentrations of scientific citation, patenting, and firm creation—paying close attention to trends in Asian economies and future prospects. Findings indicate a gradual shift to Asian economies of many biomedical-innovation and new-business-creation activities. The book concludes with implications for innovation policy and entrepreneurship strategy in Asia and elsewhere.

Something remarkable has occurred in Asia with little fanfare over the past twenty-five years. Considered severely underinstitutionalized at the end of the Cold War, Asia’s regional architecture is now characterized by a complex patchwork of overlapping alliances and multilateral institutions. How did this happen? Why should we care? And what does this mean for the future of regional order and Asian security? Adopting a new framework grounded in historical institutionalism, this book examines the transformation of Asia’s regional architecture from 1945 to the present. The book traces institutional and political developments in Asia beginning with the emergence of the postwar US bilateral alliance system and covers the debate and contention behind the rise of several post–Cold War multilateral initiatives. These include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asian Summit, Trans-Pacific Partnership, China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative, among others. Asian policy makers have endeavored to create a set of rules, norms, and institutions to build confidence, facilitate cooperation, improve governance, and ultimately bring peace and order to a region fraught with underlying historical and political tensions. Although Asia’s complex patchwork of institutions may exacerbate regional rivalries, the book demonstrates how overlapping institutions may ultimately bring greater stability to the region.

This book provides a more comprehensive, definitive, and rigorous treatment of proxy war. This book argues that proxy war can and should remain a useful and effective tool of foreign policy, but that such an endeavor demands better understanding and deliberation. Proxy war serves as a means of indirect intervention when conditions eclipse policies using direct or non-intervention. Indirect intervention, however, is not synonymous with proxy war. Rather, proxy war falls on the spectrum of indirect intervention and includes other options such as simply donating assistance to politically-motivated, local fighters or offering support to mercenary forces from outside the country. Building on this knowledge, policy makers and strategists can better judge how fixed and unchangeable conditions such as the presence of interstate competition, domestic politics, geography, and the characteristics of the international system influence proxy war. More importantly, this book explains the role of conditions that a state can alter or change to improve the utility and efficacy of proxy war—more or less, it provides a “how to” manual for conducting proxy war, should the policy be chosen. The ability to maintain a coherent policy (both internally and externally) and cultivate/maintain control over a proxy’s activities increase the chances that a proxy war policy contributes to the pursuit and attainment of national interests. The book provides a new look at proxy war using uncommon and unused cases to test the concepts presented.

This book presents the history of southern Iberia and the western Maghrib, and the Strait of Gibraltar between them, as a single bicontinental borderland, from roughly 1850 to 1970. Drawing on primary and secondary sources from several countries, it posits a long historical arc of transformation from a remote and hostile religious frontier into a multilaterally managed regional order. By the nineteenth century, the Strait of Gibraltar was becoming a dynamic focus of imperial positioning, migration, brigandage, and exchange. As a consequence, coastal outposts like Tangier, Gibraltar, and Melilla became centers of an emerging bicontinental society bringing together a kaleidoscope of ethno-religious groups. These developments produced conflict but also drew sovereign powers together to confront common challenges, such as controlling epidemic disease, defeating warlords, and managing borders. Thus, over the course of a century, despite periods of considerable violence, an international order gradually emerged in the western Mediterranean. As European empire withdrew in the late twentieth century, the region did not revert to the hostile frontier of earlier times but inherited the legacy of a relatively stable and resilient regional order. Conceptualizing the borderland in this way provides a single transnational framework to explore connections between Mediterranean geopolitics, colonialism, border formation, smuggling and brigandage, and the civil and international violence of the twentieth century. It also addresses the role of mobility in international relations, the dynamics of Muslim-Jewish relations in the context of European empire, and the ongoing controversies over Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla.

China plays a variety of status games, sometimes emphasizing its status as an emerging great power and other times highlighting its status as a fragile developing country. The reasons for this are unclear. Drawing on original Chinese sources, social psychological theories, and international relations theories, this book provides a theoretically informed analysis of China’s global rebranding and repositioning in the twenty-first century. Contrary to offensive realism and power transition theory, the book argues that China is not always a status maximizer eager to replace the United States as the new global leader. Differing from most constructivist and psychological studies that focus on the status seeking of rising powers, this study develops a theory of status signaling that combines both rationalist and constructivist insights. The book argues that Chinese leaders face competing pressure from domestic and international audiences to project different images. The book suggests that China’s continual struggle for international status is primarily driven by domestic political calculations. Meanwhile, at the international level, China is concerned about over-recognition of its status for instrumental reasons. The theoretical argument is illustrated through detailed analysis of Chinese foreign policy. Examining major cases such as China’s military transformation, China’s regional diplomacy, and China’s global diplomacy during the 1997 Asian and 2008 global financial crises, this book makes important contributions to international relations theory and Asian studies.