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Between Iran and Zion analyzes the responses of Iranian Jews to the social, political, and cultural developments of the twentieth century. The book examines their integration into the nation-building projects of the twentieth century (by the first and second Pahlavi monarchs, and then by the postrevolutionary Islamic Republic); it analyzes their various reactions to Zionism from the early twentieth century, through the state years, and until the end of that period; and it analyzes the social and cultural transformations this community underwent in a relatively short period of time, growing from marginal and peripheral community into a prominent and visible one. Between Iran and Zion examines the different groups that constituted this community—for example, the Jewish communists who became prominent activists in the left-wing circles in the 1950s, or the revolutionary organizations that won the community elections in 1978 and participated in the 1979 revolution. It also sheds light on a wide range of responses to Zionism: from religious Zionism in the early 1900s to political Zionism in the 1950s, and a combination of the two from the 1970s onward. Between Iran and Zion shows the rich ethnic, social, and ideological diversity of a religious minority in Iran amid rapid transformations.

This book argues that analyzing emigration, immigration, and re-migration under the framework of contemporaneous migration directs attention to the citizenship formations that interconnect migration sites, shaping the lives of citizens in motion. It departs from conventional approaches that study migration sites in isolation or as snapshots in time. Taking Chinese emigration as the starting point, the analysis becomes deepened by incorporating insights from migrant-receiving countries, namely Canada and Singapore, which are facing new emigration or re-migration trends among their own citizens. By analyzing shifts in migration patterns over time, we also come to understand how China is becoming an immigration country. The arguments offer new insights for researchers studying Chinese migration and diaspora. As an analytical approach, contemporaneous migration contributes to our theorization of citizenship and territory, fraternity and alterity, ethnicity, and the co-constitution of time and space.

This book presents the history of southern Iberia and the western Maghrib, and the Strait of Gibraltar between them, as a single bicontinental borderland, from roughly 1850 to 1970. Drawing on primary and secondary sources from several countries, it posits a long historical arc of transformation from a remote and hostile religious frontier into a multilaterally managed regional order. By the nineteenth century, the Strait of Gibraltar was becoming a dynamic focus of imperial positioning, migration, brigandage, and exchange. As a consequence, coastal outposts like Tangier, Gibraltar, and Melilla became centers of an emerging bicontinental society bringing together a kaleidoscope of ethno-religious groups. These developments produced conflict but also drew sovereign powers together to confront common challenges, such as controlling epidemic disease, defeating warlords, and managing borders. Thus, over the course of a century, despite periods of considerable violence, an international order gradually emerged in the western Mediterranean. As European empire withdrew in the late twentieth century, the region did not revert to the hostile frontier of earlier times but inherited the legacy of a relatively stable and resilient regional order. Conceptualizing the borderland in this way provides a single transnational framework to explore connections between Mediterranean geopolitics, colonialism, border formation, smuggling and brigandage, and the civil and international violence of the twentieth century. It also addresses the role of mobility in international relations, the dynamics of Muslim-Jewish relations in the context of European empire, and the ongoing controversies over Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla.

This book seeks a better understanding of the politics, society, and culture of early-modern Korea by tracing and narrating the history of the descendants of the Koryŏ dynasty (918–1392). Decades after persecution that virtually exterminated the former royals, the Kaesŏng Wang, the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) sought to bolster its legitimacy as the successor of Koryŏ. Emulating Chinese historical precedents, by the mid-fifteenth century, Chosŏn had rehabilitated the surviving Wangs. Contrary to the popular assumption that the Wangs remained politically marginalized, many fared well. The most privileged among them won the patronage of the Chosŏn court for which they performed ancestral rites in honor of certain Koryŏ rulers as selected by Chosŏn, passed government service examinations, attained prestigious offices, commanded armies, and constituted elite lineages throughout Korea. As members of a revived aristocratic descent group, the Kaesŏng Wang were committed to Confucian cultural and moral norms, at the heart of which was a subject’s loyalty to the ruler—the Chosŏn monarch. At the same time, Chosŏn increasingly honored Koryŏ loyalists and legacies. An emerging body of subversive narratives, both written and oral, articulated sympathy toward the Wangs as victims of the tumultuous politics of the Koryŏ-Chosŏn dynastic change, although the Wangs themselves steered clear of this discourse until after Japan’s abolition of the Chosŏn monarchy in 1910. Forces of modernity such as imperialism, colonialism, nationalism, urbanization, industrialization, and immigration transformed the Kaesŏng Wang as the progeny of fallen royals to individuals from all walks of life.

China plays a variety of status games, sometimes emphasizing its status as an emerging great power and other times highlighting its status as a fragile developing country. The reasons for this are unclear. Drawing on original Chinese sources, social psychological theories, and international relations theories, this book provides a theoretically informed analysis of China’s global rebranding and repositioning in the twenty-first century. Contrary to offensive realism and power transition theory, the book argues that China is not always a status maximizer eager to replace the United States as the new global leader. Differing from most constructivist and psychological studies that focus on the status seeking of rising powers, this study develops a theory of status signaling that combines both rationalist and constructivist insights. The book argues that Chinese leaders face competing pressure from domestic and international audiences to project different images. The book suggests that China’s continual struggle for international status is primarily driven by domestic political calculations. Meanwhile, at the international level, China is concerned about over-recognition of its status for instrumental reasons. The theoretical argument is illustrated through detailed analysis of Chinese foreign policy. Examining major cases such as China’s military transformation, China’s regional diplomacy, and China’s global diplomacy during the 1997 Asian and 2008 global financial crises, this book makes important contributions to international relations theory and Asian studies.