This chapter outlines Hegel's critique of legal formalism, which generates his later excursus into ethicality and the shapes of ethical ethê. It begins by returning to Hegel's phenomenological description of how an individual thinks. It then turns to his description of the moral content of such thinking. Hegel privileges in this regard intentions and the personal knowledge of circumstances in one's acts. Hegel finds both elements of intentionality problematic because the arbitrariness of the will displaces ethicality in both traditions.
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