Obligations of Global Justice
Obligations of Global Justice
This chapter examines the moral obligations deriving from the principles of rights-based global justice. It shows that injustice is tied to moral obligations, and that moral judgments and thus statements of justice are always prescriptive and never just declaratory. It also argues that the concept of justice is constitutively dependent on the ascription of responsibility. Moreover, the chapter considers Friedrich August von Hayek's argument that the notion of social justice is “empty and meaningless” in connection with the market, as well as Aristotle's claim that justice is the perfect and most complete virtue, perfect and imperfect obligations of justice, power and reasonableness, and the distinction between beneficence and obligations of justice.
Keywords: moral obligations, global justice, injustice, responsibility, Friedrich August von Hayek, Aristotle, virtue, social justice, power, reasonableness
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