The United States, Part 2
The United States, Part 2
Trapped by Voluntary Prisoner Repatriation
This chapter investigates dynamics at the micro (operational and policy) level, which can be seen in the United States decision to adopt a policy of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs). It describes the voluntary POW repatriation policy, the Dwight Eisenhower coalition shift, and alternative explanations for the behavior of the United States during the Korean War. At a micro level, the US decision to adopt the POW voluntary repatriation policy demonstrated the interacting dynamics of information and entrapment obstacles. The failure of Harry Truman to end the Korean War significantly led to Eisenhower's election. Eisenhower's coalition could overcome Truman's obstacles to peace. He maintained the POW policy, but he changed the US policy on nuclear deterrent power and thus felt free to escalate the war, if necessary.
Keywords: prisoners of war, United States, voluntary repatriation policy, Dwight Eisenhower, coalition shift, Korean War, Harry Truman, nuclear deterrent power
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