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Paths to PeaceDomestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War$
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Elizabeth A. Stanley

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780804762694

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: June 2013

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804762694.001.0001

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Trapped by a Hawkish Ally

(p.178) 7 China
Paths to Peace
Stanford University Press

This chapter reviews Chinese decision-making in Korean War through the lens of the entrapment obstacle. It argues that the Chinese government's policy goals shifted to modernizing and creating a planned economy as the war's domestic costs became clear. China was trapped until Joseph Stalin's death. Until his death, China was finally able to make the prisoners of war (POW) policy concessions it had been advocating. By the summer of 1952, Chinese leaders had become aware of the domestic costs of the prolonged war, and they changed their focus towards industrializing and producing a centralized, planned economy. The Chinese governing coalition wanted to end the war starting in the summer of 1952, but they could not because it was trapped by its hawkish ally, the Soviet Union. It is argued that the dovish coalition shift in the summer of 1952 helped shift Chinese war policy towards ending the war.

Keywords:   Chinese decision-making, Korean War, Joseph Stalin, China, prisoners of war, Chinese governing coalition, Soviet Union, hawkish ally, coalition shift

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