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The Global Limits of Competition Law$
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D. Daniel Sokol and Ioannis Lianos

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780804774901

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: June 2013

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804774901.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM STANFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.stanford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Stanford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in SSO for personal use.date: 18 October 2019

Judicial Scrutiny and Competition Authorities

Judicial Scrutiny and Competition Authorities

The Institutional Limits of Antitrust

Chapter:
(p.141) 10 Judicial Scrutiny and Competition Authorities
Source:
The Global Limits of Competition Law
Author(s):

Javier Tapia

Santiago Montt

Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:10.11126/stanford/9780804774901.003.0011

Institutional design delineates the allocation of power between the body with primary jurisdiction over antitrust matters, on the one hand, and the reviewing courts or tribunals, on the other. In doing so, it defines the “proper relation” between the primary decision maker (the enforcement agency) and the courts that scrutinize the actions of the enforcement agency. Institutional designers interested in pursuing this task within a particular regime must consider two sets of fundamental variables related to both the “nature” of the administrative system and the substance of the law. This chapter first analyzes these variables and their trade-offs. It then identifies four models of judicial scrutiny that fit well in comparative practice. The remainder of the chapter focuses on two of those models in more detail based upon a case study of the Chilean competition law system. It concludes that despite the limited knowledge on institutional design, judicial review would benefit from a deferential standard of review applied by courts in relation to a competition authority's expert decisions.

Keywords:   institutional design, Chile, governing body, antitrust, courts, enforcement agency, competition law, judicial review

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