This chapter addresses the offense-defense arms race in the biological arena, as this proves useful in focusing attention on those policy options that need to be conceptualized and should be implemented with a view to the 2011 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 2013 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Review Conferences. It is clear that there are no easy technical solutions to biodefense. Increasing transparency in biodefense is a problem that will not be quickly resolved. Moreover, the data does not mean that the CWC-BWC (mid-spectrum agent) gap cannot be closed to a significant degree by further development of the other chemical production facility (OCPF) verification regime, but States Parties and civil society need to give considerably more attention to how this can be accomplished than they have done to date. The most important long-term problem facing the States Parties to the BWC is how to enhance greatly the means of assuring compliance.
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