An Assessment of the Moral Basis of Alternative Organ Donation Rules
An Assessment of the Moral Basis of Alternative Organ Donation Rules
This chapter addresses the moral and ethical issues surrounding the donor compensation proposal. It takes the standpoint that the moral virtues of public policies have to be assessed in light of the consequences of those policies. Thus, a consequentialist rather than a deontological standpoint is taken here. The chapter examines the moral grounds of three organ donation systems: (i) the “altruistic” system in its current usual form; (ii) an altruistic system with some modifications, which, however, do not encompass compensating donors; and (iii) a system in which donors are compensated financially for their willingness to donate. It is argued that the current system is weak on moral grounds because it accepts avoidable death and suffering, limits individual self-determination and actions of self-defense, and treats organ patients unfairly by allocating organs to patients who have previously declined to be potential organ donors. A system that permits adequate compensation to living and postmortem organ donors is not only more effective, but also morally superior.
Keywords: ethics, donor compensation, organ donors, organ donation, organ procurement
Stanford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.