Compensation for Organ Donation and a Proposal for a Public Monopsony for Organ Acquisition
Compensation for Organ Donation and a Proposal for a Public Monopsony for Organ Acquisition
This chapter describes institutional arrangements for the introduction of compensation. It provides a simple mathematical analysis of the likely appearance of a socially directed monopsony procurement organization and establishes several propositions regarding the forms compensation might take. It suggests that both living and deceased-donor kidneys would be rewarded by such an entity, and at differing levels, at least in the early stages and in countries with severe shortages. The chapter reviews the limited empirical evidence relevant to the question of organ compensation rates, and argues that payments are likely to be well below those levels at which cost savings are consumed in acquisition expenses. On the contrary, it is quite likely that organ acquisition will be cheaper under a compensation program. The issue of the effect of offering compensation on altruistic donation levels is also addressed, along with criteria for organ recipients, as well as donor evaluation and enrollment. It is argued that the introduction of compensation for organ donation, for both deceased donors (all organs) and living donors (kidneys), could be implemented quickly in many countries.
Keywords: organ donors, donor compensation, organ donation, organ acquisition, public monopsony
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