The conclusion spells out how the theory of finance as organized conflict outlined in the book relates to approaches that emphasize scarce information as the reason for the existence of banks. It discusses how the theory extends Schumpeter’s insights on the relationship between bankers and entrepreneurs. The findings from the comparison between the United States and Italy are summarized, emphasizing the roles of the politics of the budget and of political culture. The chapter ends with a sharpened typology of wildcat and conservative bankers, discussing how this helps us understand more contemporary financial events, such as the rise of financial innovation over the past 30 years.
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