Resource Constraints and Competition Law Enforcement
Resource Constraints and Competition Law Enforcement
Theoretical Considerations and Observations from Selected Cross-Country Data
This chapter examines optimal structure and enforcement patterns of competition law enforcement agencies. Controlling for the size of the economy, larger agency size is not necessarily optimal. Highly developed economies are observed to have comparatively smaller agencies. This is likely driven by relatively better allocation of human capital, and reaping economies of scale and scope in utilization of scarce enforcement and investigative inputs. An important deficiency that prevents better understanding of enforcement patterns and institutional characteristics across countries relates to significant gaps in relevant data. International organizations such as ICN and OECD can meaningfully contribute in alleviating this deficiency.
Keywords: competition law enforcement, resource constraints, political-economy, institutional structure, regulatory independence, cross-country data
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