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Learning to ForgetUS Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq$
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David Fitzgerald

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780804785815

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804785815.001.0001

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PEACEKEEPING AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR IN THE 1990S

PEACEKEEPING AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR IN THE 1990S

Chapter:
(p.86) 4 PEACEKEEPING AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR IN THE 1990S
Source:
Learning to Forget
Author(s):

David Fitzgerald

Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:10.11126/stanford/9780804785815.003.0004

The end of the Cold War provoked a wide-ranging debate amongst policy-makers about security challenges now facing the United States. The Army’s intellectual culture however, was remarkably stable. Nonetheless the Army did adapt itself to this ‘new world order’ in two ways. Firstly, reticence towards intervention was elevated almost to the level of formal doctrine within the Army. Secondly the Army began to formulate a new peacekeeping doctrine for the 1990s. The tensions between these two approaches, both derived from different sets of lessons from Vietnam, never really affected the broader institutional identity of the Army, but they did create a paradox: that of an anti-interventionist military that nonetheless acquiesced in peacekeeping interventions. This paradox speaks not only to the particular difficulties the US faced when undertaking peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, but the way in which the ghosts of Vietnam continued to haunt the Army.

Keywords:   Peacekeeping, Operations Other Than War, Bosnia, Haiti, Somali, Colin Powell, Powell Doctrine, force protection

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