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Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency$
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Thomas H. Johnson and Barry Zellen

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780804785952

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804785952.001.0001

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The Maneuver Company in Afghanistan

The Maneuver Company in Afghanistan

Establishing Counterinsurgency Priorities at the District Level

Chapter:
(p.176) 7 The Maneuver Company in Afghanistan
Source:
Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency
Author(s):

Michael R. Fenzel

Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:10.11126/stanford/9780804785952.003.0008

Historically, the rural population in modern Afghanistan has rejected large scale reforms attempted by a central government. Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other foreign fighters use the rural border region along the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as a safe haven from which planning, training, and launches of attacks frequently occur. The initial structures established by the coalition that worked well through the first several years must evolve to a decentralize approach to counter insurgency. The reconstruction plan of Afghanistan should include dissembling provincial reconstruction teams in favor of a company level construct that focuses on distributing robust development assets at the district level. To set the conditions of success, we need to engage tribal leaders and establish a district-level security apparatus in which the district governor is the key leader elected by the shura.

Keywords:   Taliban, al-Qaeda, foreign fighter, provincial reconstruction team, tribal leader, district governor, tribal influence, Afghan National Army (ANA), shura

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