Chapter four uses cohesion theory to explain why France lost quickly and decisively in 1940. According to the theory, domestic political disputes created an apathetic military by undermining its autonomy and ability to train. As a result, the French military lacked the cohesion to recover from Germany's clever strategy. This chapter first compares the French Army of 1940 with its messianic German opponent and then with the professional French Army of World War I. Cohesion theory can explain differences between the French performance in the two World Wars. Before both wars, the Third Republic experienced great domestic turmoil. Nonetheless, they endeavored to create a first-class military organization with strong internal bonds. On the eve of World War I, these efforts created a French Army that proved capable of recovering from the early defeats of 1914 and enduring a war of attrition with Germany.
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