Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Competition and the State$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng, and Ioannis Lianos

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780804789394

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804789394.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM STANFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.stanford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Stanford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in SSO for personal use.date: 27 July 2021

Antitrust Enforcement and Regulation

Antitrust Enforcement and Regulation

Different Standards but Incentive Coherent?

(p.108) Chapter 6 Antitrust Enforcement and Regulation
Competition and the State

Alberto Heimler

Stanford University Press

This chapter examines the major difference between the approach adopted for economic regulation and that followed in antitrust enforcement. Regulation identifies a specific course of action for firms (i.e., regulation instructs firms on what to do), while antitrust firms are informed about what is prohibited (i.e., antitrust tells firms what not to do). Antitrust, by not obligating firms to a given action, is by definition more market and innovation friendly: antitrust allows firms to freely choose within a very wide set of possible actions

Keywords:   antitrust, public utilities regulation, FRAND, trade policy

Stanford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.