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Help or HarmThe Human Security Effects of International NGOs$
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Amanda Murdie

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780804791977

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: January 2015

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804791977.001.0001

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Signaling Principles INGOs, Domestic and International Communities, the State, and Human Security Effectiveness

Signaling Principles INGOs, Domestic and International Communities, the State, and Human Security Effectiveness

Chapter:
3 Signaling Principles INGOs, Domestic and International Communities, the State, and Human Security Effectiveness
Source:
Help or Harm
Author(s):

Amanda Murdie

Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:10.11126/stanford/9780804791977.003.0003

This chapter begins with the observation that the INGO world is comprised of both principled and non-principled actors. Unfortunately, actors that work with INGOs do not know what type of organization they are facing and have to rely on signals from INGOs themselves as to their underlying motivations. This chapter takes this basic contention and uses it to develop an alternative theory for when and where we should see advocacy and service INGOs be effective actors for human security outcomes. Understanding (a) uncertainty about the motivational composition of the INGO sector, (b) the peculiarities of the domestic political structures and conditions where the work is taking place, (c) the signals that the organizations send, and (d) the responses of the domestic and international communities are all critical for understanding when and where INGOs will actually matter for human security. The empirical implications of this theory are outlined.

Keywords:   game theory, signaling model, uncertainty, incomplete information, advocacy INGOs, service INGOs

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