The Islamic Republic of Iran faced a favourable strategic environment after 2001 – a window of opportunity. Iran responded by assertively seeking to expand its interests throughout the Middle East. It fell far short, however, of fulfilling its longstanding ambition to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and a leading regional power in the broader Middle East. This book develops a variant of neoclassical realism, a theory of foreign policy mistakes, to explore the causes and consequences of Iran’s sub-optimal performance. Rising power drove Iranian assertiveness, as most variants of r ... More

The Islamic Republic of Iran faced a favourable strategic environment after 2001 – a window of opportunity. Iran responded by assertively seeking to expand its interests throughout the Middle East. It fell far short, however, of fulfilling its longstanding ambition to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and a leading regional power in the broader Middle East. This book develops a variant of neoclassical realism, a theory of foreign policy mistakes, to explore the causes and consequences of Iran’s sub-optimal performance. Rising power drove Iranian assertiveness, as most variants of realism would predict. But because of the peculiar nature of Iran’s power and of the intervention of specific domestic variables, Iran’s foreign policy deviated, sometimes significantly, from structurally-induced, optimal outcomes. This sub-optimal foreign policy led to important and negative consequences for the country. Despite some gains, Iran failed to maximize its power, security and influence in three crucial areas: the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq and the nuclear program. Most crucially, as the window of opportunity steadily closes, Iran’s performance will be increasingly constrained in coming years.