Parties, Clientelism, and Violence
Parties, Clientelism, and Violence
Exclusionary Political Order in Colombia
Chapter abstract: This chapter argues that three inter-related factors explain the historical resilience of exclusionary political order in Colombia. The first is traditional elite party control over state institutions and resources as part of a closed party system. Second is the institutionalization of clientelism as a dominant linkage between citizens and the state. And third is the use of violence as an extension of political competition, a response to threats against the established political order, and a tool for varied armed actors to defend and expand territorial control. By tracing changes in these individual factors as well as the links between them over time, the chapter establishes the broader political context that continues to inform the contemporary politics of urban violence. The discussion shows why political projects in response to urban violence represent valuable opportunities for political, economic, and social actors to preserve and advance their individual interests.
Keywords: clientelism, political parties, political order, party systems, Colombia, urban violence, armed actors
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