The Dual Executive and Unilateral Power
This book takes the next step in the study of unilateral power by quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing how the president’s unilateral orders are part of a separate and shared power system. The chapters that follow explore both the prerogatives presidents undertake and obligations they fulfill with respect to their independent and administrator executive functions. It builds on several generations of scholarship on the presidency and draws from both public law and behavioral approaches. Debate over the use of unilateral orders suggests that a president’s ability to act without the consent of Congress is largely unchecked by traditional institutional arrangements whereas others suggest presidents are more likely to be restrained by Congress because many unilateral powers are justified with interbranch authority.
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