Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Dual ExecutiveUnilateral Orders in a Separated and Shared Power System$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michelle Belco and Brandon Rottinghaus

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780804799973

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: January 2018

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804799973.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM STANFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.stanford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Stanford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in SSO for personal use.date: 27 May 2020

An Independent President or Administrator?

An Independent President or Administrator?

Orders to Preempt and Support Congress

(p.118) Chapter Six An Independent President or Administrator?
The Dual Executive

Michelle Belco

Brandon Rottinghaus

Stanford University Press

Chapter 6 explores the unilateral actions of the president’s dual roles after legislation (bills) is on Congress’s agenda. At this stage, presidents can bargain with Congress over the formulation of legislation. Independent presidents use unilateral orders to preempt the lengthy legislative process and administrators do so to issue unilateral orders to support legislation. Presidents are clearly interested in issuing unilateral orders that work to their advantage whether it is to prevent legislation from progressing or to facilitate legislative progress when it is otherwise slowed by collective action problems in Congress. Presidents are more likely to use unilateral orders to preempt legislation when the issue is on their agenda, there is greater friction between the branches, Congress is internally divided, and presidents have greater discretion to act.

Keywords:   legislation, divided government, unilateral orders

Stanford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.