Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Reframing FinanceNew Models of Long-Term Investment Management$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Ashby Monk, Rajiv Sharma, and Duncan L. Sinclair

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9781503601789

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: January 2018

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9781503601789.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM STANFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.stanford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Stanford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in SSO for personal use.date: 19 October 2019

Re-intermediating Investment Management

Re-intermediating Investment Management

Chapter:
(p.54) 3 Re-intermediating Investment Management
Source:
Reframing Finance
Author(s):

Ashby Monk

Rajiv Sharma

Duncan L. Sinclair

Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:10.11126/stanford/9781503601789.003.0003

Chapter 3 focuses on the re-intermediating aspect of the collaborative model, explaining the idea that institutional investors need to re-engage with their asset managers in order to obtain greater alignment of interests. The chapter recognizes that asset managers can provide value to their investor clients under the right terms and conditions and seeks to understand what such a governance arrangement looks like. It draws inspiration from the sociology–informed relational contracting method, which emphasizes trust, mutual dependency, and cooperation over the long term as key norms of the contractual engagement. Relational contracting is thus proposed as an ideological form of governance between investors and investment managers, which is practically translated into more discrete mandates, greater responsibility for investors, greater transparency, and robust incentive structures. The chapter provides theoretical evidence for the importance of relational contacts and practical guidance for achieving them.

Keywords:   relational contracts, re-intermediation, long-term contracts, transparency, investment governance, trust, investment management

Stanford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.