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Brokering Peace in Nuclear EnvironmentsU.S. Crisis Management in South Asia$
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Moeed Yusuf

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9781503604858

Published to Stanford Scholarship Online: January 2019

DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9781503604858.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM STANFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.stanford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Stanford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in SSO for personal use.date: 19 October 2019

Setting Up the Inquiry

Setting Up the Inquiry

An Introduction to Brokered Bargaining

Chapter:
(p.27) 2 Setting Up the Inquiry
Source:
Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments
Author(s):

Moeed Yusuf

Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:10.11126/stanford/9781503604858.003.0003

This chapter introduces brokered bargaining as a three-actor model that explains patterns of state behavior in regional crises in a unipolar global setting. The chapter presents ten propositions that are posited to collectively shape crisis behavior of the United States and other strong states acting as third-party mediators and of regional rivals. Crisis behavior of regional rivals ought to be marked by a constant tension between their incentives to pursue their maximalist objectives and their compulsion not to defy the third party completely given its power to tilt the crisis decisively against them. The third party would seek to heighten the antagonists’ sensitivity to its preference for de-escalation ahead of their ideal crisis outcomes. Brokered bargaining unpacks the processes and mechanisms that underpin this trilateral interaction. The last part of the chapter presents the methodology applied to the case studies in the next section of the book.

Keywords:   brokered bargaining, unipolarity, regional nuclearization, nuclear crisis behavior, bilateral nuclear deterrence, reward-punishment leverage, resolve-prudence trade-off, crisis stability, structured focused comparison, United States

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